Structured Public Record Analysis of the Use of Deadly Force Resulting in the Death of DeAundre Hill including: Timeline and Statement of Facts Policy and Procedure Analysis and Matrix Kansas Criminal Law Charge Analysis and Matrix Kansas Criminal Law Doctrinal Analysis and Matrix

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Victim: DeAundre Hill

Date: February 20, 2026

Incident: Use of Deadly Force

Agency: Wichita Police Department

Location: Brickstone at Woodlawn Apartments

Disclaimer: This document was prepared by a non-lawyer with no formal legal training. The analysis reflects independent research and comparison of publicly available Wichita Police Department policies, applicable Kansas statutes, and the factual information presented by the Sheriff during the public press conference regarding this incident. The purpose of this document is to organize, compare, and present that information in a structured manner. It does not offer legal advice, make findings of criminal guilt, or substitute for judicial or prosecutorial determinations.

Incident Timeline

12:47 a.m.

- Officers dispatched on 911 call regarding fight between man and woman. No apartment number is given.

12:57 a.m.

- Officers arrive at the apartment complex.
- Officers enter the residential building to investigative activity on upper floor.
- They knock on a door random door, but no one answers.

1:00 a.m.

- Officers hear loud conversation lower floor and descend to investigate.

1:02:22 a.m. - 1:03:49 a.m.

- Officers arrive at apartment 415 and hear loud conversation between two men that continues throughout contact.
- Officers initiate contact at an apartment door with weapons drawn.
- They knock twice neither are standard loud knock of a police officer.
- They announce themselves several times but not loud enough to be heard over conversation inside the apartment.
- They are asked by DeAundre Hill to move to where they can be seen but they do not.

1:03:50 a.m.

- Officers reposition within the hallway.
- Two officers go up the set of stairs to right of apartment door to first landing and hide.
- Third officers go down the hall to left of apartment door around a corner in front of another apartment.

1:04:01 a.m.

- The apartment door opens and DeAundre Hill steps out.
- No signs of commands being given from officers that are hiding on stairs, and they have their gun trained.
- No signs of commands are given from officer down hiding down hallway.

1:04:02 a.m.

- DeAundre Hill takes a step.
- No signs of commands being given from officers that are hiding on stairs, and they have their gun trained.
- No signs of commands are given from officer down hiding down hallway.

1:04:03 a.m.

- DeAundre Hill takes a step.
- No signs of commands being given from officers that are hiding on stairs, and they have their gun trained.
- No signs of commands are given from officer down hiding down hallway.

1:04:04 a.m.

- DeAundre Hill reaches corner leading corner leading into hall.
- No signs of commands being given from officers that are hiding on stairs, and they have their gun trained.
- No signs of commands are given from officer down hiding down hallway.

1:04:05 a.m.

- DeAundre Hall turns corner in to hallway.
- Officers on stairs are behind him still in position.
- Officer down hall in front of him

1:04:06 a.m.

- Officers' discharges firearm unclears which officers or from which direction.
- A total of nine shots are fired, unclear which officer or officers shot.
- The DeAundre Hill is struck by gunfire, unclear how many hits.
- The injuries prove fatal. Death occurs at the scene as a result of the gunshot wounds.

Statement of Facts

The following statement of facts is based solely on the minimum tangible evidence publicly released by the Sheriff's Office on January 21, 2026, including timelines and body-worn camera footage, and not on verbal characterizations or narrative statements. It is intended to provide a factual background of the events leading to the use of deadly force and the death of DeAundre Hill.

1. Initial Law Enforcement Activity

- Law enforcement officers were conducting a late-night investigation.
- The investigation was not limited to the original call for service.
- Officers elected to pursue additional investigative activity at a residential location.
- No emergency or exigent circumstances requiring immediate action were identified.

2. Location and Setting

- The incident occurred at an apartment complex.
- The encounter took place inside a residential building.
- The area involved a confined interior hallway.
- Lighting conditions were limited due to nighttime hours.
- The setting restricted visibility, movement, and reaction time.

3. Officer Approach and Contact

- Officers approached the residence during nighttime hours.
- Contact was initiated at the apartment door.
- Officers were positioned outside the apartment prior to the door being opened.
- Officers were armed at the time of contact.
- Manner/timing of identification by officers not described as occurring prior to the encounter escalating.

4. Development of the Encounter

- The door to the apartment was opened during the encounter.
- The interaction occurred in close proximity within the hallway.
- The encounter unfolded rapidly after initial contact.
- There was limited time for verbal exchange or clarification.

5. Perceived Threat and Escalation

- Officers reported perceiving a threat during the encounter.
- Weapons were drawn by officers.
- The perceived threat developed during the interaction in the hallway.
- The compressed space and close distance contributed to the rapid escalation.

6. Use of Deadly Force

- Officers discharged their firearms.
- A total of nine shots were fired.
- The shots were fired within a span of approximately five seconds after the perceived threat was identified.

7. Resulting Injuries and Death

- The individual was struck by gunfire.
- The individual sustained multiple fatal gunshot wounds.
- The death occurred at the scene as a result of the gunshot wounds.

8. Conclusion of the Encounter

- The use of deadly force ended the encounter.
- Emergency response followed the shooting.
- The individual was pronounced deceased.

Policy and Procedure Analysis

This analysis examines relevant Wichita Police Department policies and procedures applicable to the officer conduct at issue. It is intended to identify the standards governing officer actions, including investigative practices, identification, positioning, use-of-force decision-making, and de-escalation expectations. The purpose of this review is to provide context for evaluating whether officer conduct aligned with established departmental requirements, based on available information, without drawing conclusions regarding criminal or civil liability.

1. **Investigating the Wrong Location Without Articulable Cause**
    a. What they did
        i. Responded to a call involving a man and a woman at a different location.
        ii. Approached DeAundre Hill's apartment anyway.
        iii. No evidence of a domestic disturbance inside his unit.
    b. Policies Disregarded
        i. Policy 906 (Purpose & Reasonableness)
            1. Officers must make tactically sound and reasonable decisions.
            2. Creating a new investigative target without corroboration increases risk unnecessarily.
        ii. De-escalation requirement to reassess scope.
            1. Officers are expected to continually reassess whether police involvement is justified.
            2. This was mission creep, not investigation.
    c. Why these matters
        i. Everything that followed stems from this unjustified expansion.
        ii. If they do not belong there, every downstream "threat" is self-created.
2. **Treating Lawful Noise as Criminal Suspicion**
    a. What they did
        i. Interpreted a loud, boisterous conversation as justification to initiate contact.
        ii. No report of violence, threats, or weapons from the apartment.
    b. Policies Disregarded
        i. Policy 906 (Assessment of Behavior)
            1. Officers must distinguish criminal behavior from lawful conduct.
            2. Noise ≠ exigency.
        ii. Training on constitutional policing
            1. Officers are trained that lawful behavior does not become suspicious just because it is inconvenient or unfamiliar.
    c. Why these matters
        i. This is pretextual policing.
        ii. policy does not allow escalation based on vibes.
3. **Late-Night Knock Without Clear Police Identification**
    a. What they did
        i. Knocked around 1 a.m.
        ii. Claimed to identify themselves as police, but did not do so in a clear, consistent, or audible manner reasonably likely to be heard or understood by the occupants.

b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 Tactical Communication
        1. Requires clear, calm, and professional identification sufficient to be understood by the person being contacted.
c. De-escalation principles
    i. Confusion and fear must be reduced, not amplified.
d. Why this matters
    i. WPD trains officers that fear reactions are predictable in late-night encounters.
    ii. They created ambiguity, then punished the response to it.

4. Choosing Concealment Instead of Transparency

a. What they did
    i. Hid in a narrow, dark hallway.
    ii. Took tactical positions instead of visible identification.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 De-Escalation
        1. Tactical positioning must reduce risk, not heighten it.
        2. Leveraging distance and barriers
        3. Officers could have repositioned, exited, or created space.
c. Why this matters
    i. Concealment is a tactical escalation, not a neutral choice.
    ii. Policy does not permit officers to manufacture surprise and then claim fear.

5. Ignoring a Direct, Reasonable De-Escalation Request

a. What they did
    i. DeAundre Hill asked them to stand in front of the peephole.
    ii. Officers refused.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 Active Listening
        1. Officers must engage with reasonable requests that reduce risk.
        2. Assessment of fear and emotional response
    ii. This was a textbook fear-based request.
c. Why this matters
    i. This was a clear offramp and they chose escalation over clarity.

6. Forcing the Resident to Investigate an Unknown Threat

a. What they did
    i. Left DeAundre Hill with no confirmation of who was outside.
    ii. Created conditions where retrieving a firearm was foreseeable and lawful.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 (Foreseeability)
    ii. Officers are trained to anticipate civilian reactions.
c. Use-of-Force Continuum
    i. Officers may not provoke the conditions they later cite as justification.
d. Why this matters
    i. WPD policy does not allow officers to create danger and then respond to it with deadly force.

7. Failing to Disengage When Identification Failed

a. What they did
    i. Stayed in place after failing to make contact.
    ii. Did not disengage.
b. Policies Disregarded

i. Policy 906 Tactical Pause and Reassessment
    1. Officers must pause and reassess when communication fails.
c. Sanctity of Life language
    i. Continuing a failing approach violates lifesaving priorities.

8. Failing to Call Additional Resources

a. What they did
    i. Did not request additional officers.
    ii. Did not rotate communicators.
    iii. Did not seek supervisory input.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 Requesting Additional Officers
        1. Explicitly required when rapport cannot be built.
        2. Training on team-based de-escalation

9. Weapon Presentation Without an Identified Threat

a. What they did
    i. Drew weapons before a confirmed threat existed.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Use of Force Continuum
        1. Firearms are not neutral tools.
    ii. Policy 906 proportionality
        1. Weapon presentation escalates encounters and must be justified.

10. Cornering a Resident in a Confined Space

a. What they did
    i. Forced the encounter into a shared hallway.
    ii. Eliminated retreat, distance, and time.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 Distance and Cover
        1. Officers must create space when feasible.
c. De-escalation doctrine
    i. Confined spaces increase lethal outcomes and should be avoided.

11. Failure to Recognize Lawful Gun Possession

a. What they did
    i. Treated firearm possession as automatic lethal threat.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Training on lawful gun ownership
    ii. Kansas is an open-carry state.
c. Policy 906 Assessment of Intent
    i. Possession ≠ intent.

12. Failure to Issue Clear, Calm, Sequential Commands

a. What they did
    i. Rapid escalation.
    ii. No evidence of clear, single-officer command structure.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 Tactical Communication
    ii. One officer should communicate.
    iii. Commands must be clear and actionable.

13. Failure to Allow Time for Compliance

a. What they did
    i. Fired within ~5 seconds.

b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 Leveraging Time
    ii. Time is a de-escalation tool.
c. Use-of-Force necessity standard.
    i. Deadly force must be unavoidable.

14. Using Deadly Force Without Exhausting Lower Options

a. What they did
    i. Jumped directly to lethal force.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Use of Force Continuum
    ii. Deadly force is last resort.
c. Policy 906 encouragement of voluntary compliance

15. Collective Failure to Intervene

a. What they did
    i. No officer slowed, repositioned, or stopped the escalation.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 Duty to Intervene
    ii. Applies before shots fired, not just during.

16. Violating the Spirit of Training They Claim to Follow

a. What they did
    i. Ignored ICAT principles.
    ii. Ignored ABLE principles.
    iii. Ignored crisis-informed policing.
b. Policies Disregarded
    i. Policy 906 (training integration)
    ii. Training is not optional.
    iii. Department-wide emphasis on de-escalation since 2016

Policy and Procedure Analysis Conclusion

The officers' conduct reflects multiple, sequential, and compounding violations of Wichita Police Department Policy 906 and related procedures. These violations occurred before contact, during attempted communication, through tactical decision-making, and at the moment deadly force use. The totality of the conduct demonstrates a failure to follow required de-escalation, assessment, communication, and intervention standards, resulting in the avoidable death of DeAundre Hill

FORMAL POLICY AND PROCEDURE VIOLATION MATRIX

I. PRE-CONTACT / DISPATCH PHASE			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Responded to a call for service involving a man and a woman at a different location.	Policy 906 (Purpose; Reasonableness)	Officers must make tactically sound decisions consistent with the mission of the call.	Officers expanded the scope of the investigation without dispatch direction or corroboration.
Selected DeAundre Hill's apartment as investigative target	Policy 906 (Assessment & Reassessment)	Officers must continually reassess whether police involvement is justified.	No articulable facts linked the apartment to the reported disturbance.
Treated lawful noise as basis for investigation	Policy 906 (Assessment of Behavior)	Officers must distinguish criminal conduct from lawful behavior.	Loud conversation alone does not constitute exigency or criminal activity.
II. DECISION TO INITIATE CONTACT			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Initiated late-night contact (~1 a.m.)	Policy 906 (De-Escalation)	Officers must consider time, fear response, and context.	Officers initiated contact at a time known to heighten fear without necessity.
Failed to clearly and consistently identify as police	Policy 906 (Tactical Communication)	Officers must use clear identification and communication.	Lack of clear identification increased confusion and risk
Continued contact despite lack of clear purpose	Policy 906 (Purpose & Voluntary Compliance)	Officers must seek voluntary compliance where feasible.	No lawful objective requiring immediate contact existed.
III. TACTICAL POSITIONING AND ENVIRONMENT			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Took concealed tactical positions	Policy 906 (De-Escalation; Tactical Positioning)	Positioning must reduce risk and preserve options	Concealment escalated tension and eliminated transparency.
Remained in narrow, dimly lit hallway	Policy 906 (Distance and Barriers)	Officers should increase distance and use barriers when feasible.	Officers chose a confined space that compressed time and reaction options.
Drew weapons without confirmed threat	Use of Force Continuum (Policy 906)	Firearm presentation must be proportionate and justified.	Weapons were drawn absent an identified imminent threat.
IV. COMMUNICATION FAILURES			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Refused request to stand in front of peephole	Policy 906 (Active Listening; Tactical Communication)	Officers should accommodate reasonable requests that reduce fear.	Officers rejected a clear de-escalation opportunity

Failed to assign a single communicating officer	Policy 906 (Tactical Communication)	Communication should be limited to one officer when possible.	Lack of structured communication increased confusion
Failed to clarify identity after confusion persisted	Policy 906 (Assessment & Reassessment)	Officers must reassess when communication fails.	Officers persisted in a failing approach
V. FAILURE TO DISENGAGE OR SEEK ALTERNATIVES			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Did not disengage after failed identification	Policy 906 (Tactical Pause; Reassessment)	Officers must pause and reassess when tactics fail	Officers remained committed to escalation.
Did not reposition or exit the building	Policy 906 (Distance; Tactical Repositioning)	Officers should create space when feasible	Officers maintained proximity that increased risk.
Did not request additional officers or alternate communicator.	Policy 906 (Requesting Additional Officers)	Additional resources should be used when rapport fails	Officers failed to use available de-escalation resources
VI. FORESEEABILITY AND PROVOCATION			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Created ambiguity about who was at the door	Policy 906 (Foreseeability)	Officers must anticipate reasonable civilian reactions	Officers failed to anticipate a lawful self-defense response.
Continued concealment knowing resident was uncertain	Policy 906 (De-Escalation)	Officers must reduce fear-based escalation	Officers amplified fear rather than mitigating it
Provoked conditions cited as threat	Use of Force Principles	Officers may not create the danger they later respond to	The threat environment was officer-manufactured.
VII. ENCOUNTER ESCALATION			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Advanced encounter into shared hallway	Policy 906 (Distance and Cover)	Officers must preserve time and space	Officers eliminated both
Treated lawful firearm possession as lethal intent	Policy 906 (Assessment of Intent)	Possession alone does not equal intent	Officers failed to distinguish possession from threat
Issued rapid or unclear commands. (if any)	Policy 906 (Tactical Communication)	Commands must be clear, sequential, and allow compliance.	Time to comply was not provided
VIII. USE OF DEADLY FORCE			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Fired within ~5 seconds	Policy 906 (Leveraging Time)	Time should be used as a de-escalation too. I	Officers did not allow time for compliance
Discharged nine rounds	Use of Force Continuum	Deadly force must be necessary and unavoidable.	Lower-force alternatives were not exhausted
Used lethal force absent exhaustion of options	Policy 906 (Voluntary Compliance)	Officers must encourage compliance before deadly force.	Officers bypassed policy-required steps
IX. DUTY TO INTERVENE			

Officer Action	Policy / Procedure	Policy Requirement	Deviation
No officer slowed or redirected tactics	Policy 906 (Duty to Intervene)	Officers must intervene to prevent unreasonable force.	Collective failure to act
No evidence of contemporaneous objection	Policy 906 (Duty to Report)	Officers must report excessive force	Silence constitutes non-compliance
X. SYSTEMIC AND TRAINING FAILURES			
Officer Action	**Policy / Procedure**	**Policy Requirement**	**Deviation**
Ignored ICAT principles	Policy 906 (Training Integration)	Officers must apply de-escalation training	Training not reflected in conduct
Ignored ABLE bystandership principles	Policy 906 (Duty to Intervene)	Officers must act to prevent harm	Bystander failure
Acted contrary to "sanctity of life" mandate	Policy 906 (Purpose)	WPD identifies as a lifesaving organization	Conduct directly contradicted mission

Kansas Criminal Law Charge Analysis

This analysis evaluates whether the officer actions described in the Sheriff's public press conference meet the statutory elements of potential criminal offenses under Kansas law. The review relies exclusively on facts as publicly presented by law enforcement. Criminal liability is governed by statute. Departmental policy is not criminal law but may be relevant to statutory elements such as recklessness, necessity, foreseeability, and unlawful manner.

Kansas Statutes Referenced

1. **K.S.A. 21-5227**
    a. Use of force by law enforcement officer. Governs when a law enforcement officer may use deadly force and limits justification to circumstances where the officer reasonably believes such force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.
2. **K.S.A. 21-5202(j)**
    a. Definitions; culpable mental states. Defines "recklessly" as conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk constituting a gross deviation from reasonable care.
3. **K.S.A. 21-5405**
    a. Involuntary manslaughter. Defines the offense as killing a human being committed recklessly or during the commission of a lawful act in an unlawful manner.
4. **K.S.A. 21-5403(a)(2)**
    a. Murder in the second degree. Defines the offense as an unintentional killing committed recklessly under circumstances manifesting extreme indifference to the value of human life.

Criminal Liability Breakdown

1. **Legal Justification for Use of Deadly Force K.S.A. 21-5227**
    a. Statutory Standard
        i. Deadly force is justified only if reasonably believed necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.
        ii. ii. The belief must be objectively reasonable.
        iii. The force must be necessary and proportionate.
        iv. Justification does not extend to danger created by unlawful or reckless officer conduct.
    b. Required Legal Conditions
        i. Lawful authority.
        ii. Imminent threat.

iii. Necessity of force.
iv. Absence of officer-created jeopardy.

c. Application to Described Conduct
i. The investigation expanded beyond the original call.
ii. Contact was initiated without clear identification.
iii. Available alternatives to deadly force were not used.
iv. The threat developed after officer-created ambiguity.

2. Recklessness Defined K.S.A. 21-5202(j)

a. Statutory Definition
i. Conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
ii. Disregard constituting a gross deviation from reasonable care.

b. Indicators Considered
i. Awareness of risk.
ii. Foreseeability of harm.
iii. Failure to mitigate known risks.

c. Application to Described Conduct
i. Late-night unidentified contact created foreseeable fear.
ii. Failure to clarify identity prolonged uncertainty.
iii. Continuation of concealed positioning increased risk.

3. Involuntary Manslaughter K.S.A. 21-5405

a. Statutory Elements
i. A human being was killed.
ii. The death was caused by the defendant.
iii. The killing was committed recklessly, or
iv. The killing occurred during a lawful act done in an unlawful manner.

b. Recklessness Theory
i. Conscious disregard of a substantial risk of death.
ii. Risk was unjustifiable.
iii. Conduct was a gross deviation from reasonable care.

c. Lawful Act in an Unlawful Manner Theory
i. Police investigation is a lawful act.
ii. ii Deadly force may render that act unlawful if unjustified.
iii. Failure to meet statutory use-of-force limits converts lawful conduct into unlawful conduct.

d. Application to Described Conduct
i. The encounter was initiated without necessity.
ii. Stabilizing alternatives were available but not used.
iii. Deadly force followed escalating tactical decisions.

4. Second-Degree Murder K.S.A. 21-5403(a)(2)

a. Statutory Elements
i. A human being was killed.
ii. The death was caused by the defendant.
iii. The conduct was reckless.
iv. The recklessness manifested extreme indifference to human life.

b. Extreme Indifference Factors
i. Creation of highly dangerous conditions.
ii. Disregard of obvious safety measures.
iii. Conduct exceeding ordinary recklessness.

c. Application to Described Conduct

i. The encounter occurred in a confined residential hallway.
ii. Weapons were drawn prior to clear threat confirmation.
iii. Deadly force was used rapidly without time for compliance.

Kansas Criminal Law Charge Analysis Conclusion

Based on the applicable Kansas criminal statutes and the facts described, the officer conduct raises significant questions about whether the use of deadly force was legally justified and whether the encounter involved reckless conduct as defined by Kansas law. The actions taken before the use of force, including investigative and tactical decisions, are central to evaluating reasonableness, necessity, and causation. Because the risk environment developed through officer decisions and directly preceded the fatal outcome, the facts support further consideration of potential criminal charges under Kansas law, consistent with statutory standards governing use of force and recklessness

FORMAL CRIMINAL CHARGE ANALYSIS MATRIX

Charge / Statute	Statutory Standard / Elements	Required Legal Conditions	Application to Described Conduct	Criminal Liability Assessment
Legal Justification for Use of Deadly Force (K.S.A. 21-5227)	Deadly force justified only if reasonably believed necessary to prevent imminent death or great bodily harm; belief must be objectively reasonable; force must be necessary and proportionate; justification excluded if danger is officer-created.	Lawful authority; imminent threat; necessity of force; absence of officer-created jeopardy.	Investigation expanded beyond original call; contact initiated without clear identification; alternatives to deadly force available but unused; threat arose after officer-created ambiguity.	Statutory justification is undermined; deadly force justification not clearly established.
Recklessness (K.S.A. 21-5202(j))	Conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk constituting a gross deviation from reasonable care.	Awareness of risk; foreseeability of harm; failure to mitigate known risks.	Late-night unidentified contact created foreseeable fear; failure to clarify identity prolonged uncertainty; concealed positioning increased risk.	Conduct supports a finding of recklessness.

Involuntary Manslaughter (K.S.A. 21-5405)	Human being killed; death caused by defendant; killing committed recklessly or during a lawful act done in an unlawful manner.	Recklessness; unjustifiable risk; gross deviation from reasonable care; lawful act rendered unlawful by unjustified deadly force.	Encounter initiated without necessity; stabilizing alternatives available; deadly force followed escalating tactical decisions.	Elements satisfied under recklessness and lawful-act-in-unlawful-manner theories.
Second-Degree Murder (K.S.A. 21-5403(a)(2))	Human being killed; death caused by defendant; reckless conduct manifesting extreme indifference to human life.	Creation of highly dangerous conditions; disregard of obvious safety measures; conduct exceeding ordinary recklessness.	Confined residential hallway; weapons drawn before clear threat confirmation; deadly force used rapidly without time for compliance.	Facts support potential finding of extreme indifference to human life.

Kansas Criminal Law Doctrinal Analysis

This section addresses the legal doctrines that govern how criminal statutes are applied to the facts described in the Sheriff's public press conference. The analysis focuses on principles of causation, officer-created risk, justification, and the evidentiary role of departmental policy in criminal proceedings. This doctrinal analysis does not identify or evaluate specific criminal charges. Instead, it explains the legal rules that determine whether statutory elements such as recklessness, necessity, foreseeability, and justification may be satisfied. As with the charge analysis, this review relies exclusively on facts as publicly presented by law enforcement and applies Kansas law as written. Criminal liability remains governed by statute. The doctrines discussed here inform how those statutes are interpreted and applied but do not create independent criminal offenses. criminal liability.

1. **Causation and Officer-Created Risk**
    a. Governing Law: K.S.A. 21-5202; K.S.A. 21-5227; Kansas proximate-cause doctrine Kansas criminal liability requires that the defendant's conduct be a legally sufficient cause of death.
    b. Legal Standard
        i. The defendant's conduct must be a substantial factor in producing the death.
        ii. Foreseeable responses by others do not break the chain of causation.
        iii. An intervening act severs causation only if it is extraordinary and unforeseeable.
    c. Officer-Created Jeopardy Limitation
        i. K.S.A. 21-5227 does not justify deadly force where the necessity for such force is created by the officer's own unlawful or reckless conduct.
        ii. Justification is evaluated in light of the totality of circumstances, including officer decisions that shape the risk environment.
    d. Application to the Described Conduct
        i. The risk environment developed through officer decisions regarding investigation scope, identification, positioning, and timing.

ii. A defensive response to unidentified late-night contact is a foreseeable reaction.
iii. The lethal outcome followed directly from the conditions created during the encounter.

2. Reasonableness and Necessity in Use of Force

a. Governing Law: K.S.A. 21-5227 Kansas law conditions justification for deadly force on objective reasonableness and necessity.
b. Reasonableness
    i. The officer's belief must be objectively reasonable under the totality of circumstances.
    ii. Reasonableness is assessed in light of facts known at the time and the officer's own conduct leading up to the use of force.
c. Necessity
    i. Deadly force must be necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm.
    ii. Necessity is undermined where feasible alternatives exist and are not used.
d. Application to the Described Conduct
    i. Officers initiated contact without clear identification.
    ii. Opportunities to disengage, reposition, slow the encounter, or seek additional resources were available.
    iii. The perceived threat developed after officer-created ambiguity and compression of time and space.

3. Recklessness and Foreseeability

a. Governing Law: K.S.A. 21-5202(j) Recklessness is a culpable mental state distinct from negligence and intent.
b. Statutory Definition
    i. Conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk.
    ii. Disregard constituting a gross deviation from reasonable care.
c. Role of Foreseeability
    i. Foreseeability informs whether the risk was substantial and unjustifiable.
    ii. A risk is foreseeable when a reasonable person would anticipate the harm as a likely outcome.
d. Application to the Described Conduct
    i. Late-night unidentified contact created foreseeable fear.
    ii. Refusal to clarify identity prolonged uncertainty.
    iii. Continuation of concealed positioning increased the likelihood of a defensive response.

4. Lawful Acts Performed in an Unlawful Manner

a. Governing Law: K.S.A. 21-5405. Kansas law recognizes that otherwise lawful conduct may become criminal when performed unlawfully.
b. Legal Principle
    i. Police investigation is a lawful act.
    ii. The use of force may render that act unlawful if it exceeds statutory limits.
c. with Use-of-Force Statutes
    i. K.S.A. 21-5227 defines the lawful boundaries of force.
    ii. Conduct outside those boundaries may satisfy the "unlawful manner" element of K.S.A. 21-5405.
d. Application to the Described Conduct
    i. The investigation expanded beyond the original call without necessity.
    ii. Deadly force was used following a chain of escalating tactical decisions.
    iii. The lawfulness of the underlying act depends on whether statutory justification is satisfied.

5. **Evidentiary Role of Departmental Policy**
    a. Governing Law: K.S.A. 21-5202(j); K.S.A. 21-5405; K.S.A. 21-5403(a)(2); K.S.A. 21-5227
    Departmental policy does not define criminal liability but may be relevant to statutory analysis.
    b. Legal Function
        i. Policy violations are not criminal offenses.
        ii. Statutory elements govern criminal liability.
    c. Relevance to Criminal Elements
        i. Policy deviations may inform recklessness by demonstrating conscious disregard of risk.
        ii. Policy deviations may undermine claims of necessity or reasonableness.
        iii. Policy deviations may support an "unlawful manner" analysis.
        iv. Policy deviations may be probative of extreme indifference when conduct exceeds ordinary recklessness.
    d. Analytical Limitation
        i. Policy violations alone do not establish criminal guilt.
        ii. Policy evidence is relevant only to the extent it bears on statutory requirements.

Kansas Criminal Law Doctrine Analysis Conclusion

Taken together, the governing Kansas criminal law doctrines demonstrate that the legality of the officer's conduct cannot be assessed solely at the moment deadly force was used but must be evaluated in light of the full sequence of decisions that created and shaped the encounter. Kansas law requires a close examination of causation, reasonableness, necessity, recklessness, and foreseeability, all of which are informed by the officer's own conduct leading up to the fatal outcome. Where the risk environment is substantially influenced by investigative choices, timing, positioning, and identification practices, those choices are legally relevant to determining whether statutory justifications apply.

FORMAL CRIMINAL DOCTRINE ANALYSIS MATRIX

Doctrinal Issue	Governing Law	Legal Standard / Principles	Application to Described Conduct	Doctrinal Significance for Criminal Liability
Causation and Officer-Created Risk	K.S.A. 21-5202; K.S.A. 21-5227; Kansas proximate-cause doctrine	Defendant's conduct must be a substantial factor in producing death; foreseeable responses do not break causation; intervening acts sever causation only if extraordinary and unforeseeable; deadly force not justified when necessity is created by officer's own unlawful or reckless conduct.	Risk environment developed through officer decisions regarding investigation scope, identification, positioning, and timing; defensive response to unidentified late-night contact was foreseeable; lethal outcome followed directly from conditions created during encounter.	Supports proximate causation and defeats claims that the victim's response constituted a superseding cause; undermines statutory justification for deadly force.
Reasonableness and Necessity in Use of Force	K.S.A. 21-5227	Deadly force must be objectively reasonable under the totality of circumstances and necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm; necessity is undermined where feasible alternatives exist.	Officers initiated contact without clear identification; opportunities existed to disengage, reposition, slow the encounter, or seek additional resources; perceived threat developed after officer-created ambiguity and compression of time and space.	Weakens justification defense by demonstrating lack of objective reasonableness and necessity at the moment deadly force was used.

Recklessness and Foreseeability	K.S.A. 21-5202(j)	Recklessness requires conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk constituting a gross deviation from reasonable care; foreseeability informs whether the risk was substantial and unjustifiable.	Late-night unidentified contact created foreseeable fear; refusal to clarify identity prolonged uncertainty; continued concealed positioning increased likelihood of defensive response.	Supports a culpable mental state of recklessness for manslaughter and potentially extreme indifference analyses.
Lawful Acts Performed in an Unlawful Manner	K.S.A. 21-5405; K.S.A. 21-5227	Police investigation is a lawful act; use of force renders the act unlawful when statutory limits are exceeded; conduct outside lawful force boundaries satisfies the unlawful-manner element.	Investigation expanded beyond original call without necessity; deadly force followed escalating tactical decisions; lawfulness hinges on whether statutory justification is met.	Supports involuntary manslaughter liability under the lawful-act-in-an-unlawful-manner theory.
Evidentiary Role of Departmental Policy	K.S.A. 21-5202(j); K.S.A. 21-5405; K.S.A. 21-5403(a)(2); K.S.A. 21-5227	Policy violations are not crimes; statutory elements control criminal liability; policy evidence is relevant only as far as it bears on statutory analysis.	Policy deviations may demonstrate conscious disregard of risk, undermine necessity and reasonableness, support unlawful-manner analysis, or evidence extreme indifference when conduct exceeds ordinary recklessness.	Policy evidence may corroborate statutory elements but cannot independently establish criminal guilt.

Comprehensive Conclusion of the Incident Timeline, Statement of Facts, Policy and Procedure Analysis, Kansas Criminal Law Analysis and Kansas Criminal Doctrine Analysis

This document compiles and organizes the minimum tangible public record released by the Sheriff's Office, including published timeline markers and body worn camera footage, alongside publicly available Wichita Police Department policies and applicable Kansas criminal statutes. It was prepared by a non-lawyer for the limited purpose of structuring, comparing, and presenting that information in a coherent analytical framework. It does not offer legal advice, make findings of criminal guilt, or substitute for judicial or prosecutorial determinations. Its function is to clarify how the facts as publicly released intersect with governing policy standards and statutory requirements.

When the incident timeline and statement of facts are examined together, the encounter is shown to originate from a late-night investigation that expanded beyond the original call for service and progressed into a confined residential environment. The publicly released materials reflect that the encounter unfolded inside a residential building, in a narrow interior hallway, during nighttime hours with limited lighting and restricted visibility. These environmental conditions compressed time, space, and reaction options before any use of force occurred. The sequence of events demonstrates that investigative scope, approach decisions, communication methods, officer positioning, and tactical concealment preceded and materially shaped the circumstances under which deadly force was ultimately used.

The timeline further establishes that the final moments of the encounter occurred within a highly compressed window of approximately five seconds during which nine shots were fired. That rapid escalation did not arise in isolation but followed a series of discretionary choices that narrowed alternatives, increased ambiguity, and heightened foreseeable risk. The public record shows that opportunities existed earlier in the encounter to disengage, reposition, clarify identification, request additional resources, or otherwise slow the interaction. Those opportunities are relevant not because they dictate outcomes, but because Kansas law evaluates use of force in light of the totality of circumstances, including decisions that precede the moment deadly force is applied.

The policy and procedure analysis identifies multiple sequential deviations from Wichita Police Department Policy 906 and related standards governing investigation, communication, de-escalation, positioning, proportionality, and intervention. While departmental policy does not define criminal liability, it provides relevant context for evaluating statutory elements such as recklessness, necessity, reasonableness, and foreseeability. The cumulative nature of the identified policy deviations reflects a pattern of conduct that increased risk rather than mitigated it and undermined the department's stated emphasis on de-escalation, sanctity of life, and risk reduction.

The Kansas criminal charge analysis and doctrinal analysis apply the relevant statutes and interpretive principles to the same set of publicly described facts. Together, they underscore that Kansas law does not assess justification, recklessness, or causation by isolating the final trigger pull. Instead, it requires examination of whether the officer's conduct was a legally sufficient cause of death, whether the perceived threat and necessity for deadly force were objectively reasonable, and whether the risk environment was created or materially amplified by officer actions. The doctrines of officer created jeopardy, foreseeability, lawful acts performed in an unlawful manner, and proximate causation are central to this evaluation and are directly implicated by the sequence of events described.

Taken as a whole, the assembled timeline, factual record, policy comparison, statutory analysis, and doctrinal framework demonstrate that the death of DeAundre Hill cannot be evaluated as a momentary or unavoidable outcome detached from preceding decisions. The publicly released facts reflect a chain of investigative and

tactical choices that shaped the encounter, constrained alternatives, and directly preceded the fatal use of force. Under Kansas law as written, those choices are legally relevant to assessing justification, recklessness, and criminal liability. This document therefore supports further formal scrutiny, grounded in statute and evidence, of whether the use of deadly force was legally justified and whether the conduct described may satisfy the elements of criminal offenses under Kansas law, while leaving ultimate determinations to the appropriate prosecutorial and judicial authorities.

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